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ABSRACT
In the aftermath of the events of 9/11, the U.S. executive branch has repeatedly
maintained that its need for action to secure the nation requires a revised
interpretation of individual liberties. This study will explore the tensions between
the positive ideographs <privacy> and <national security> in response to the
negative ideograph <terrorism> in a contemporary United States court ruling. Using
Burke’s pentad, and cluster analysis, as well as Brummett’s notion of strategic
silence, the study examines how the FISCR substantially changed the
interrelationship between the two ideographs. The study concludes that the FISCR
situated strengthening national security as the purpose of the case it ruled on, which
privileged national security over privacy. Throughout the expansion of <national
security,> the court used silence to justify its decision. This analysis both adds to our
understanding of the synchronic relationship between ideographs, and examines
how the courts utilize such interplays to reconstitute community.
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CHAPTER 1.
INTRODUCTION
In August 2008, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review
(FISCR) issued a rare public judicial opinion on a case petitioning a warrantless
directive to turn over information on customers, even U.S. citizens, considered to be
outside the United States. The service provider argued that the directive issued
under the Protect America Act violated its customers’ Fourth Amendment rights,
and that the surveillance mandated by the directive was unreasonable. The FISCR
disagreed, saying that safeguards to prevent unnecessary invasions of privacy were
in place, and that the courts should not frustrate government attempts to protect its
citizens.1 This opinion is an important, contemporary example of the longstanding
confrontation between national security and civil liberties in U.S. history.
Since the earliest days of the United States, political leaders have used
national security as a warrant to curtail civil liberties in times of crisis. The Alien
and Sedition Acts of 1798 restricted free speech during a quasi‐conflict with France,
and during World War I, the Espionage Act of 1917 was similarly exercised.
Abraham Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus during the Civil War, and
Franklin Roosevelt trampled due process by rounding up and holding Japanese
citizens during World War II. In a December 1940 Fireside chat entitled “On
National Security,” Roosevelt said, “This is not a fireside chat on war. It is a talk on
national security; because the nub of the whole purpose of your President is to keep
you now, and your children later, and your grandchildren much later, out of a last‐
ditch war for the preservation of American independence, and all of the things that
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American independence means to you and to me and to ours.”2 In a speech to
United States newspaper editors, John F. Kennedy cited the First Amendment’s need
to bend before necessities of national security in times of duress and beseeched
editors to ask, “Is this in the interests of national security?” before printing a story.3
These are just a handful of examples of national security in dissonance with civil
liberties throughout United States history.
Due to the development of privacy as a civil liberty within the context of
technological advancements, national security and privacy more often begin to
intersect in elite discourse in the 1950s. Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis
introduced the notion of privacy in U.S. law in 1890 in response to an increasingly
invasive media. The article garnered support for privacy as a right, but an informal
one. The development of telephones and surveillance equipment proved to be the
step that brought security and privacy into conflict. Because communications
technology linked people, the government could encroach on privacy through
surveillance. By the 1960s, privacy had gained traction as a popular term. However,
fearing communists, Joseph McCarthy and Richard Nixon justified surveillance
programs that invaded privacy on national security grounds. In response to civil
unrest related to unhappiness over Vietnam and the fear of communists, “The NSA,
the CIA, and the FBI deployed conventional investigative techniques against a
variety of domestic critics and political opponents, but engaged as well in break‐ins,
mail openings, and warrantless wiretaps.”4 In addition, Nixon attempted to use the
IRS and the Defense Intelligence Agency to stop internal threats, which included the
use of extra‐constitutional searches and seizures.5
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During the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, interests of national security and
privacy increasingly collided, and courts more frequently allowed the government
to invoke the state secrets privilege. In case law, United States v. Reynolds set an
early precedent for state privilege to restrict information, and Halkin v. Helms
reinforced the state secrets doctrine.6 In these cases of suspected privacy violations,
plaintiffs were unable to prove any kind of damage had been done because the
government argued that releasing information that might have built such cases
would jeopardize national security. Laird v. Tatum and United States v. United States
District Court are two surveillance cases from the early 1970s that further illustrate
this synchronic relationship between privacy and national security.7 In Laird, the
plaintiff alleged the U.S. Army encroached on his privacy, but the court ruled that the
danger of damage was too speculative. United States v. United States District Court,
also known as the Keith case, directly led to the development of Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) and its court (FISC) for the approval of wiretaps.
The growing problem of terrorism furthered the competition between
privacy and national security. During the Reagan administration, in particular,
surveillance in the guise of counterterrorism increasingly pitted the two terms
against one another. During Reagan’s tenure, the FBI used surveillance to gather
information on more than 100 groups highlighted by the Committee in Solidarity
with the People of El Salvador. In addition, the FBI arrested a group of Middle
Easterners, who became known as the L.A. 8, for supporting terrorists.8 Despite
10,000‐pages of evidence amassed by the government, the judge dismissed the case
because it lacked merit. The judge accused the government of overreaching by
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acting solely in the name of national security and said it was quite disturbing “to
hear from the government its justification for its conduct in a case where the
plaintiffs have made a preliminary showing that the government in effect treated
them as if it could do whatever it wants.”9 In short, the 1980s shifted the public
context for tensions between privacy and national security from communism to
terrorism.
Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, national security and privacy
have clashed more frequently than any time since the 1980s. Privacy advocates
argue that the FBI has suffered an egregious breakdown in oversight, as it can look
at portions of emails through extended pen registers.10 The Patriot Act made it
easier to receive a warrant for wiretapping, and it extended the period that wiretaps
could be active. Civil liberties leaders have blasted “sneak and peak” warrants that
allow for secret searches and the blurring of the “the wall” between intelligence and
enforcement agencies.11 Linda Fisher notes that in the wake of these changes, it is
much easier to target groups and individuals based on political tendencies and guilt
by association rather than actual illegal activity.12 Brenton Hund points out that
minorities, immigrant and aliens will likely suffer the most.13 The passage of the
Patriot Act and the initiation of the Terrorist Surveillance Project provide a rich
example of the conflict between privacy and national security, as demonstrated by
the FISCR decision. In the weeks following 9/11, the terms were evoked in memory
of the tragedy, leading to a rushed passage of the bill that sacrificed some
conventional privacy expectations due to national security claims.
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Based on the usage of these terms to unify the culture around the passage of
the Patriot Act and the Terrorist Surveillance Project, the following will review the
literature on what Michael McGee termed ideographs and demonstrate how the
terms “privacy” and “national security” now qualify as ideographs for the American
culture. Particularly in times of crisis, the phrase “national security” gains
prominence in political and popular rhetoric. I will argue that national security
functions as what Michael Calvin McGee calls an ideograph, which is a culture‐
specific linkage between rhetoric and ideology that prompts collective
commitment.14 Then I will discuss how legal discourse should be viewed as
appropriate texts for analyzing ideographs because such decisions can constitute
and reconstitute imagined communities. Last, I will describe a method of analysis
appropriate for understanding how the two ideographs interrelate.
Ideographs
McGee views ideographs as the basic unit for constituting community.
According to McGee, ideographs, when analyzed closely, are not difficult to identify.
The slogan‐like terms often masquerade as technical political terms, and what is
unifying about ideographs is that they enter everyday discourse as articulations of
personal motives. They become one‐sum orientations, a heuristic symbolizing an
entire line of ideological argumentation.15
McGee is clear that elites, like members of the general public, are susceptible
to ideological appeals because they are culturally learned. Rhetorical resources in
general and ideographs in particular influence those exercising power:
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By learning the meaning of ideographs…everyone in society, even the ‘freest’
of us, those who control the state, seem predisposed to structured mass
responses. Such terms as ‘liberty’ constitute by our very use of them in
political discourse an ideology that governs or ‘dominates’ our
consciousness. In practice, ideology is a political language composed of
slogan‐like terms signifying collective commitment.16
In this way, McGee connects rhetoric to ideology through the ideograph. Thus, how
the ideograph is deployed rhetorically allows, limits, or changes access to ideology,
reflecting normative collective commitment.
McGee outlined four defining characteristics of ideographs. These include:
1) they are ordinary language terms in political discourse; 2) they are high‐order
abstractions representing collective commitment; 3) they warrant the use of power,
guiding inappropriate behavior into acceptable channels; and 4) they are culture‐
bound.17 For McGee, a negative ideograph, like slavery, represents an unacceptable
action in a community, while a positive ideograph, like liberty, represents an ideal.18
But, most importantly, the ideograph is distinguishable from other rhetorical
tropes because of persuasive power. Ideographs have more persuasiveness than
other tropes because of the socialization process that trains the mind to accept and
invoke culturally imbedded ideologies. Ideographs are central to the structure of
the culture they constitute, and, thus, can sometimes change the perception of a
rhetorical situation when invoked.
A number of scholars have employed McGee’s concept of the ideograph in
their examinations of U.S. culture. In Crafting Equality, Celeste Condit and John
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Lucaites conducted an extensive diachronic analysis of the term <equality>
beginning at the early period of U.S. history. Condit and Lucaites examined the
negotiated meaning of <equality> and its development as an ideograph. They
looked at its flexibility as it articulated with other ideographs, such as <property>
and <liberty>, by analyzing speeches, newspapers, and other culture‐bound popular
discourses.
While scholars tend to agree that ideographs exert power within cultures,
disagreement exists about who defines their meaning. In her work on the ideograph
<clash of civilizations>, Dana Cloud argues, in contrast to McGee and Condit’s
conceptualization of the ideograph, that a hegemonic elite always frames the term
<clash of civilizations>, with the result that the phrase lacks the flexibility of
<equality> and other ideographs. She writes that the ideologies and exigencies
exercised with the term are “so similar in each war…the phrase’s meaning echoes
the reified interpretation of the past.”19 Carol Winkler also advocates that elites can
control the meaning of ideographs when she argues that the executive branch
frames the meaning of terrorism due to its control of information about the threat.20
A point of agreement in the literature on ideographs is that positive and
negative ideographs frequently form an oppositional relationship to one another.
Carol Winkler argues that the negative ideograph <terrorism> functions as the most
“pejorative, emotive” ideological marker of American culture.21 She details its use in
presidential discourse in opposition to the positive ideographs <freedom> and
<democracy>, contending that <terrorism> demarcates what is acceptable in
American culture verses what is not. Winkler notes that the terms “barbarism,”
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“Communism,” and “tyranny” have all contributed to the meaning of the ideograph,
as well as narratives of war and crime.22 Winkler examines negative and positive
ideographs in opposition to each other, but analyzing how positive ideographs are
in conflict with other positive ideographs is not a focus of her project.
Few scholars, however, have examined how a negative ideograph can change
the synchronic relationship between two positive ideographs. Trevor Parry‐Giles
examination of Margaret Thatcher’s use of the negative ideograph <terrorism> in
relation to positive ideographs like <rule of law> and <freedom of speech> is a
notable exception. He determines that Thatcher’s rhetorical use of <terrorism>
forces a specific construction of <freedom> and <rule of law> that allowed her to
restrict <freedom of speech>.23
My study examines how <terrorism> functions to change the synchronic
relationship between the two ideographs, <privacy> and <national security>. It
adds to the insights of Parry‐Giles by demonstrating how tools other than the
cluster analysis expand our understanding of how the meaning of positive
ideographs shifts in the context of both competing ideals and threatening,
unacceptable behaviors. As a result, future critics will be able to better examine the
synchronic relationship between positive and negative ideographs. Specifically, this
study asks, “How do the positive ideographs <national security> and <privacy>
function in response to the negative ideograph <terrorism>?”
As well as potentially adding to ideographic theory, this study will consider
the implications for the United States’ community based on the intersection of the
terms <privacy> and <national security>. Detailing the interactions between the
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two terms could illuminate collective commitment of the United States community
through our usage of the ideographs. Agreement, tension, and privilege between
these terms represent cultural commitments that can have an impact on many
members of the population. As noted above, a number of United States minorities
can suffer if the terms align in a way that subordinates the interests of privacy to
those of national security.
Privacy as an Ideograph
Privacy qualifies as an appropriate term to analyze in this study because it
meets all four characteristics of an ideograph. First, McGee argues that ideographs
are “ordinary terms in political discourse.”24 Marouf Hasian catalogues the
prevalence of the term <privacy> in popular 1960s discourse. Articles highlighting
privacy appeared in the New York Times, Redbook, Atlantic Monthly, and several
other publications. Almost universally, popular discourse demonstrated a “vibrant
rhetorical culture” that applauded “liberal conceptions of privacy.”25
Second, McGee argues that an ideograph is an abstraction that represents
commitment to an “equivocal but ill‐defined normative goal.”26 According to
Winkler and Edwards, this ambiguity allows subgroups to remain committed to a
larger community despite difference in interpretation.27 The abstract nature of
privacy can be seen in the Constitution. Privacy is not mentioned explicitly
anywhere in the Constitution, but it is protected implicitly by the First, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The variety of different
Amendments applicable to the protection of privacy demonstrates the flexible
application of the term.
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Another venue for examining the vagueness of privacy is the legal debate
over the nature of the term. William Prosser drives the legal discourse by pitting a
reductionist approach to privacy against a protective one. Prosser argues that
privacy is not a single identifiable right, but an amalgam of other rights.28 Edward
Bloustein and Jefferey Rieman challenge Prosser’s analysis, arguing that privacy is
actually related to the human condition much more fundamentally than property.
Rieman contends that privacy was a necessary condition for the formation of
intimate relationships.29 Bloustein argues that privacy was an essential component
of human dignity.30 According to Hasian, popular discourse not only mirrors the
arguments Rieman and Bloustein were making, but co‐created a narrative of
<privacy>. He quotes a Time magazine author who claims that, “For only in the
healing and sometimes illuminating moments of privacy can a man make himself
truly fit to live with others.”31 Hasian cites the New York Times’ observation that
right to privacy was becoming “more and more firmly established.”32 The
competing conceptions of privacy demonstrate a flexible, abstract quality necessary
to serve as an ideograph.
Third, McGee contends that an ideograph “warrants uses of power” and
“guides behavior and belief into channels easily recognized by a community as
acceptable and laudable.”33 In Katz v. United States, privacy warrants a citizen’s
right to talk on the phone without being wiretapped, even when they were doing
something illegal, such as gambling.34 Abortion activists argue that the right to
privacy covers a woman’s decision whether to terminate a pregnancy. In Griswold v.
Connecticut, the judiciary justifies a couple’s right to purchase and use birth control

11
as a matter of privacy. Despite reservation by some gay marriage activists, the right
to privacy is often invoked to defend same‐sex unions, and for more than a decade,
the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy has been applied to homosexuals in the armed
forces. Additionally, the ACLU defends a citizen’s right to smoke marijuana in their
home based on an expectation of privacy. Whether relating to issues of intrusion,
search and seizure, or other facets of privacy, the term warrants the individual’s
power to reject interference of another party.
Last, McGee asserts that ideographs are culture‐bound. He claims that
groups of the public who do not respond appropriately to ideographic interaction
will suffer societal penalties.35 According to Alan Westin, moments of natural
function such as birth, death, illness, excretion, and sex are taboo and require a
degree of privacy in the United States as well as many other societies.36 However,
he lists several cultures that defy these expectations of privacy. He notes Margaret
Mead’s study of Samoan’s who wear little to no clothing, bathe in the sea, and use
beaches as a bathroom without seeking solitude.37 Westin points out several
cultures in the South Pacific as well as the Siriono Indians in Bolivia that seek a low
degree of privacy for sex. Because of tight living quarters they often have
intercourse in the bushes, but “do not seem to mind the presence of other persons
that come onto the scene.”38
A key characteristic that lends privacy its persuasive power is its connection
to ideology. The “right to be let alone,” as Judge Thomas M. Cooley put it, is a
powerful sentiment stemming from the classical liberalism on which the Declaration
of Independence was based.39 Although privacy was never articulated in early
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American documents, privacy’s connection to liberal individualism seems to
reinforce other early notions of American thought. Ferdinand Schoeman argues that
privacy is a necessity for social freedom40, and L. Susan Brown supports this, writing
that liberal individualism as an ideology places “paramount importance” on freedom
of the individual.41 Brown further explains that the exercise of free will and self‐
determination is what defines humans and sets them apart for early liberal
thinkers.42 Oren M. Levin‐Waldman supports this assertion, writing that privacy
speaks to liberal individualism, “which is no less than the essence of agency.”43
Deriving from fear of reduced agency, Schoeman notes that Americans increasingly
fear that their sphere of privacy is being reduced despite ample evidence that we
actually enjoy a much higher level of privacy than our ancestors.44 According to
Levin‐Waldman, the fundamental purpose of liberal individualism is “to defend
against oppressive demands and intrusions of authority” that might chip away at
American’s freedom or agency.45 In sum, <privacy> invokes the notions of free will,
autonomy, and personal freedom associated with liberal individualism, which
Americans have been socialized to identify as central to their community.
National Security as an Ideograph
National security is also an ordinary language term in political discourse.
According to Elisabeth Anker, national security concerns are often framed as a
melodramatic narration that depicts victimization and redemption. It plays well in
the media, providing plenty of opportunity for popular discourse. 46 Robert Ivie
notes that popular and elite discourse often frame threats to <national security> as
attacks by “savages.”47 He interprets George Bush’s rhetoric as positioning the U.S.
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as a blessed country whose security is under assault by evil men intent on
destroying democracy and freedom.48 In addition to Bush, nearly every president in
the 20th century has addressed national security on multiple occasions. Hollywood
has fixated on the topic as numerous movies and television shows, including 24,
National Security, The Sum of All Fears, and Patriot Games. Countless authors as
popular as Tom Clancy and John Updike have based novels on national security.
Second, the term represents a collective commitment to a vague, normative
objective. Michael Hirsh outlines three phases of commitment for <national
security>: the Monroe Doctrine from the early stages of the nation until World War
I, a global conception ushered in by Woodrow Wilson, and a preemptive notion of
national security founded by George Bush.49 The Monroe Doctrine warned the
United States to avoid “entangling alliances” with the U.S. getting embroiled in only a
handful of conflicts. Woodrow Wilson and his successors offered a much more
expansive idea of U.S. <national security> leading to conflicts in Vietnam and Korea
as well as helping rebuild Europe after World War II. Finally, Bush’s conception of
national security includes intervening anywhere in the world as long as it can stop
an attack on U.S. interests.50 In these different phases, national security has meant
avoiding alliances, assisting in global conflicts, and even invading nations to stop a
threat before it exists.
Denise Bostdorff, argues the usage of the term “crises,” which bears some
similarities to national security, has become rhetorically appealing for American
leaders. “Crisis” focuses the attention of citizens and implies a sense of urgency for
quick action and possible sacrifice, even when presented with limited, unclear
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information. The term generates fear in an audience and demarcates those uncluded
in the scenario into the threat and the threatened, forcing commitment to an
objective outlined by leaders.51 The enemy and the objective in these situations are
often ill‐defined. Though Bostdorff is not analyzing ideographs, her work
illuminates the study of national security as an ideograph. For example, Bostdorff
looks at enemies in Cambodia, Cuba, and Grenada. In various crises, Muslims,
Soviets, and Chinese communists represent the enemy. In other cases, such as the
Oklahoma City bombings, the enemy is a domestic foe. The meanings associated
with national security, as well as the vague, ill‐defined nature of enemies and threats
when presented with national security concerns represents a collective
commitment to an unclear, normative goal.
Third, national security warrants the use of power and guides behavior.
When a public official, particularly a president, gives voice to a crisis, it warrants
action because of the gravity of a threat. Not only does the fear of a threat muddle
clear thought on the exigence, but government officials often withhold information
to prevent hysteria. According to Robert Ivie, it is impossible to determine actual
risk objectively when rhetors invoke national security because a cycle of
interconnected symbols short circuits any clear thoughts.52 Additionally, invoking
national security during a crisis serves to shut down competing discourses and
prompt deference to elite discourse because of tightly guarded information. 53 On
the basis of national security, governments have engaged in behavior that would, in
almost all cases, be considered antisocial in more normal contexts. The threat of
terrorism warranted war in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as extensive surveillance
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programs historically in the United States. In the 1960s and 1970s, the FBI sought
to disrupt the activities of civil rights activists and peace protesters by engaging in
break‐ins, warrantless wiretaps, and bugging homes and offices.54 According to
David Cole and Jack Dempsey, the FBI attempted to “spread misinformation, foment
internal dissention, and even provoke illegal activity.”55 During the 1980s, in an
attempt to identify CISPES members, the FBI “checked license plate numbers in
church parking lots, sent an informant into CISPES offices to copy and steal records,
and questioned activists both at home and at work.”56 In 2004 the United States,
fearing a threat to national security, indicted a Saudi student on charges of
supporting terrorism for creating a website that linked to websites featuring texts of
Muslim clerics. After 18 months in jail, the student was acquitted when the
prosecution failed to show any evidence that he had advocated violence despite
listening to roughly 9,000 phone calls and collecting some 20,000 emails.57
Last, national security is culture‐bound because a community’s security
interests vary by culture. For the United States, controlling the spread of nuclear
weapons is a matter of national security. Iran or North Korea acquiring nuclear
weapons represents a threat to national security, and leaders in those countries
view nuclear weapons as a way to ensure their security. The United States is
unwilling to disarm because nuclear weapons protect security, and the government
is opposed to allowing rival nations to gain the same advantage.
A significant portion of national security’s persuasive power comes from its
connection to personal safety. National security represents a protection designed to
ensure a country’s well‐being by stopping threats from harming the state. For
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instance, in times of crisis, citizens frequently swap rights for an enhanced feeling of
security, as curfew restrictions and internment camps for Japanese Americans in
World War II attest. The term both appeals to our need to protect our own safety, as
well as the safety of our culture. For example, when terrorists attacked the World
Trade Center, relatively few Americans died, but popular support for national
security prompted two wars and the passage of laws that substantially strengthened
the powers of both law enforcement and intelligence agencies.
The power of national security stems, in large measure, from the American
exceptionalism myth. Mary Stuckey argues that an ideograph’s persuasive power
comes from working in concert with other terms to gain a “wealth of associations,”
which are often connected to mythic narratives.58 Andrew Rojecki explains the
myth, writing, “The values that support the exceptionalist view marry
Enlightenment ideals of individual reason and liberty with religious and moral
views uprooted from their origins in Puritan piety.”59 This marriage leads
Americans to imagine themselves as morally superior to a fallen world, according to
Ivie and Giner.60 Ivie, Campbell, and Rojecki all note that a sense of moral
superiority can develop into a “you’re with us or against us” attitude. Thus, during
crises the use of national security is particularly persuasive because the term draws
not only on a threat to American values such as liberty, but a threat to the moral
purity of the nation. By drawing on the American exceptionalist myth, <national
security> gains significant persuasive power as an ideograph within the American
culture.
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Analyzing Ideographs within Legal Discourse
Many communication scholars argue that because ideographs both represent
a socialization process and appear abundantly in popular history, they should be
examined in popular discourse. However, a handful of communication scholars
prefer to examine ideographs found in elite discourse rather than popular discourse.
Parry‐Giles examines the discourse of the prime minister because he is interested in
the limits of terms in public debates. Similarly, Winkler looks at presidential
discourse on <terrorism> because “the offices primarily responsible for responding
to terrorism fall within the purview of the chief executive.”61 In addition, the
executive controls the bulk of the nation’s terrorism information, meaning the
media must rely heavily on executive sources.62 Such powers privilege the
president’s ability to constitute community and identity.
While presidential discourse is useful for examining <terrorism>, legal
discourse also provides a rich context for analyzing the nexus of <privacy> and
<national security>. For my case study of <privacy> and <national security> in the
law, I rely on two theories to justify the analysis of legal discourse. First, White’s
theory of law as constitutive rhetoric explores the connection between law, rhetoric,
and the constitution of community. Second, Anderson’s theory of the imagined
community clarifies the nature of community. I utilize these theories to gain a
nuanced look at how ideographs in the law constitute community by drawing on
ideology. By looking at particular applications of these theories, a picture of the
ways in which ideographs are negotiated and framed by disparate interests
emerges.

18
According to James Boyd White, law is constitutive rhetoric that is situated in
a rhetorical culture. In other words, court opinions are records of a negotiation of
public interests that employ rhetorical resources to varying degrees of
persuasiveness to help constitute community through binding statutes. White offers
a conception of the law as a narrative in which what is probable is established. Law
defines expectations of speech and conduct, thus giving us the terms for
constructing a “social universe.”63
According to White, lawmakers must take into account three principles when
embarking on the construction of a community. First, law is a culture‐specific
intervention of thought and argument.64 Employing the language of their audience,
lawmakers must persuade the intended group that a statute is justified to impose on
the community in a certain way. The language of an audience presents resources
and limits when making law. Celeste Condit calls what White is describing a
“rhetorical culture,” which is the range of linguistic options available to a rhetor,
including, to name a few, allusions, images, metaphors, and ideographs, to name a
few.65
Second, if the law is conceived as a set of resources for thought and argument
based on a shared language, disagreements often arise on terms or interpretation of
resources.66 The uncertainty leads to a process of creative debate and continuous
change, where lawmakers spar over the primacy of particular ideographs or the
applicability of certain metaphors. White writes, “In speaking the language of the
law, the lawyer must always be ready to try to change it: add or drop a distinction,
to admit a new voice, to claim a new source of authority, and so on.”67 Since the law
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is open to change, it can respond to exigencies. Change may be incremental, but the
law does provide flexibility. Condit concurs, writing, “…laws are always open to
reinterpretation and change when advocates craft new ideologies or invent new and
compelling usages of the components of the rhetorical culture.”68 McGee argues that
this characteristic of law is partially based on the abstract meaning of ideographs.69
Third, if the law has boundaries that expand and contract based on response
to an exigency, then the nature of the society it constitutes is open for debate. White
calls law a constitutive rhetoric, meaning it enables people to say “we” and share a
consistent meaning, and therefore is a building block of community.70 Stuart A.
Scheingold takes this argument even further, examining three principles of the rule
of law: realism, convenience, and ethics. He argues people see law as based on the
reality of a community rather than the way the ideal community, so people trust the
pragmatism of the law. He contends that most people are willing to leave the
implementation of law to professionals out of convenience. Last, he sees the law as
grounded in popular American ethical values such as equality and professional
responsibility, giving the law even more popular legitimacy.71 Maurice Charland
clarifies that not all constitutive rhetorics are successful; a community member can
accept none, part, or all of a constitutive rhetoric.72 He claims that constitutive
rhetorics “work upon previous discourses” to capture new subjects in an experience
more like “conversion” than “persuasion.”73
McGee argues that ideographs are culture‐bound, meaning their power
comes from the specific communities that they constitute. Ideographs are a
socializing force, and Scheingold argues that a hallmark characteristic of United
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States culture is an intense historical dependence on legal symbols.74 Because of the
American dependence on the <rule of law> as well as the binding nature of the law,
legal discourse can set the agenda for what issues the public will face. Ideographs
are derived from the culture they come out of, but legal discourse can set
boundaries on the meaning of those terms within popular discourse.
As such, a constitutive rhetoric should primarily be concerned with defining
the type of community that is possible. White’s work on constitutive rhetoric
suggests that the law can place boundaries on a community and constrain behavior.
Condit believes that ideographs, more than any other tool in a rhetorical culture,
enable the law to coalesce into a temporary compromise between competing
interests.75 This case study on <privacy> and <national security> will provide an
example of ideographic analysis to underscore the value of White and Condit’s
theoretical contributions.
While White’s work provides useful theoretical background, the value of his
perspective can be extended. For White, simply being able to say “we” and imagine
that “we” share a consistent meaning is enough to describe a community. However,
White also describes the law as shifting and elusive. If the law is not consistent, as in
the case of the Protect America Act that was enacted for only a short window of
time, what are “we” actually claiming? If there is no continuity to the community
that “we” are claiming, what are “we?” Not only does the law have dynamic
boundaries that are constantly debated, but also few in a national community can
claim knowledge of what the law actually says. Within a select group of experts on
security and privacy, community can be claimed under this description. But a
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broader community encompassing those not familiar with the intricacies of the law
becomes troublesome because the rules and boundaries are unclear.
Benedict Anderson’s work on nationalism provides a more nuanced look at
what he calls the imagined community, which helps clarify some of White’s notions
without addressing legal discourse explicitly. Anderson disputes the notion that
people can reasonably say “we” since so few people can possibly have a material
connection among millions. He calls the community imagined because “members of
even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members.”76 Despite
this and the fact that all communities have varying degrees of inequality,
communities demand a “deep, horizontal comradeship.”77 He cites a nation’s ability
not just to send troops to war, but it’s ability to instill a motivation to possibly die
for one’s country.
Another important distinction Anderson draws about imagined communities
is that they are limited. A community defines its boundaries and can rhetorically
create others in opposition to them. A negative ideograph, such as <terrorism>, is
often powerful because it is defined in opposition to one’s own personal or national
identity. Robert Ivie provides an example of this dichotomy, arguing that politicians
and the media in America portray terrorists as savages or barbarians bent on
destruction in contrast to sophisticated rational Americans who love freedom.78
Certain texts provide touchstones that foster the development of community,
and some scholars argue that legal documents play a significant role in the
constitution of American community. Anderson treats the novel and the newspaper
as the shared texts that underpin the nationalistic bond between people that have
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not and will not ever meet.79 According to Kenneth Burke, documents such as
United States Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, and the Bill of Rights
represent symbolic interactions for the United States by setting rules.80 It creates a
“trained incapacity” for citizens to think of governmental alternatives to democracy
by generating a “terminology, or a set of coordinates for the analysis of motive.”81
Supporting this assertion, Scheingold argues that most people believe the
Constitution protects the interests of the citizens by codifying political principles,
such as rights and obligations. As outlined in Scheingold’s myth of rights, the
majority of Americans think judges only have to follow the letter of the law in the
Constitution, and they will wisely protect the democratic community.82
While case law may be little known by most and dynamic for all, the material
consequences of the law are still the same, and Scheingold argues most Americans
are content to trust professionals to handle the contours of the law.83 Because the
full might of government can back enforcement, the law, in this sense, creates a
social universe by defining the limits of acceptable behavior among those in the
imagined community. Furthermore, the law often invokes ideographs within the
law to sanction or deter behavior. For example, a negative ideograph like
<terrorism> would not only prompt judges to assign material consequences to those
associated with such activities, but speakers would invoke the term in opposition to
positive ideographs like <liberty> to justify such punishments.
Because legal documents constitute community by providing a common
vocabulary and demarcating acceptable behaviors for its citizens, the language that
courts use to constitute that community is important to analyze. By looking at
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cultural terms, such as ideographs, a critic can determine what strategies a judge
uses to constitute community. This study will focus on the interplay between the
positive ideographs <national security> and <privacy> in response to the negative
ideograph <terrorism>.
Method
To study the tension between the ideographs <privacy> and <national
security> in legal discourse, I focused on a legal opinion, In Re Directives, published
by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review in January 2008.
Established by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act in 1978, the FISC is a secret
court in which the government can apply for a special warrant for foreign
intelligence surveillance. The court can expedite surveillance in matters sensitive
matters of national security, and the FISCR is the court of appeals for the FISC.
Because the court handles surveillance related to national security, which intersects
with privacy concerns, it is a useful place to examine the tension between privacy
and national security. Additionally, due to the secret nature of the court, this is only
the second opinion the court has published in its 40‐year history, making it a unique
document worthy of study.
Besides offering a rare glimpse into the court’s balancing of the two
ideographs, the FISCR opinion is swirling within the controversy surrounding the
Bush administration’s warrantless wiretapping. In 2005 the New York Times
revealed that the Bush administration was conducting surveillance of United States
citizens through the Terrorist Surveillance program. According to LexisNexis, from
2005‐2010, more than 500 articles subsequently focused on the phone surveillance.
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The Senate and House responded to growing public awareness and concern about
the wiretapping by holding hearings in which they questions Bush administration
officials on the government’s methods and the scope of their application.84 Despite
much public backlash, Congress passed the Protect America Act, which authorized
the executive to continue wiretapping.
Borrowing from Parry‐Giles’s methodological approach, I will use Kenneth
Burke’s cluster analysis as a foundation for determining the interactions between
the ideographs in the FISCR decision. Cluster analysis is well suited to analyzing
privacy and national security because clusters reveal tension and ideology by
identifying how terms are agonistically paired. According to Burke, a rhetor’s choice
of vocabulary constitutes a particular reflection of reality. By looking at words that
cluster around particular term, a critic can identify what aspects of that term the
rhetor is attempting to highlight. Burke writes, “You may, by examining his work,
find ‘what goes with what’ in these clusters—what kinds of acts and images and
personalities and situations go with his notions of heroism, villainy, consolation,
despair, etc.”85 For Burke, word clusters map a rhetor’s associations of images and
words, which can reveal motive or ideology. So by examining word clusters that
emerge around the ideographs <privacy> and <national security>, I will be able to
identify points of incompatibility between the ideographs and determine how
ideology is articulated in the opinion.
I will add a second step, however, by examining the pentad in the court’s
opinion. Language clustered around the various pentadic elements in the opinion
will provide further insight into the court’s meaning. By analyzing the ratios of the
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pentad, this study will help reveal the underlying meaning of the court’s opinion.
Finally, I will explore how the language clusters in the introductions and
conclusions bracketing the extensive use of redaction in the opinion will help
readers understand how the use of silence in In Re Directives functions to contribute
to the ideographs’ meaning. Burke advises critics to attend to transitions in rhetoric,
such as introductions and conclusions, because they tend to be particularly
revealing about underlying motives of the rhetor.86 While such insights will not be
definitive about the withheld content, they do offer revealing hints about how the
meaning of the employed ideographs evolved in the court’s opinion.
Chapter Outlines
Chapter two will analyze how <privacy> and <national security> function
within the court’s discussions of constitutionality. It will review literature that
develops Burke’s notion of constitutionality for background, identify the court’s use
of pentad to depict its opinion, and specifically look at the how the scene‐act ratio
determines what the Court calls constitutional. To further explicate the court’s
motives, the chapter will also examine how the inclusion and exclusion of former
definitions of the ideographs influences the ruling on constitutionality.
Chapter three will examine how <privacy> and <national security> function
within the court’s use of redactions. It will draw upon previous literature about
rhetorical silence, analyze the court’s language immediately preceding and following
its use of redactions, and then consider the redactions as clusters that reveal
motivations of the court. This chapter will analyze how ideographs can help readers
understand the strategic meaning of silence within court opinions.
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Chapter four will offer concluding comments on the analysis, including a
summary of major conclusions and arguments presented throughout this project. It
will also present limitations of the study and offer further avenues for research and
contributions to the disciplines of communication and law.

27
CHAPTER 2.
CONSTITUTION AND EXCEPTION
Much legal discourse in the United States is concerned with the
constitutionality of government actions and legislation, and the FISCR opinion is no
exception. The opinion mentions the words “constitutional” or “constitutionality”
twenty‐two times. A number of scholars have analyzed the Constitution, but
Kenneth Burke provides one of the richest accounts. In Grammar of Motives, he
examines the U.S. Constitution as a representative anecdote of symbolic action. As
such a “calculus of motives,” the Constitution provides underlying principles that
govern the nation.87 Even more importantly, it establishes the scene for future
action.
A number of scholars mention Burke’s take on the Constitution. In
developing what he calls a “dialectic of motives,” Jeffery Murray briefly notes that
the Constitution, according to Burke, produces social cohesion because it provides a
shared rhetoric of motives.88 James P. Zappen argues that the Constitution is an
agonistic instrument that exemplifies a dialectical transcendence. It “upholds at
once both unity and diversity, as in the very name ‘The United States.’”89 According
to Ellen Quandahl, constitutions exemplify specific motives that come into conflict
with other social covenants, and which covenants are chosen constitutes human
psyche as well as social order.90 For these scholars, Burke’s work on Constitution
represents a central aspect of the constitution of the U.S. community.
A handful of scholars have examined Burke’s work on Constitution in depth.
Trevor Parry‐Giles argues for an alternate conception of the Constitution. Instead of
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a traditional model where the Constitution expresses tension between power and
limits, Parry‐Giles contends that the Constitution should be read as a
characterological document. Parry‐Giles writes, “The characterological nature of
the American Constitution permits, indeed compels, a character/leader based
politics that results in the embodiment of ideology and the commitments that
constitute ideology with particular individuals facing scrutiny as they attempt to
lead.”91 Parry‐Giles’s conception provides a novel way of viewing the Constitution,
but a traditional model is more applicable to my study. On the traditional model,
Parry‐Giles writes, “A constitution of power ‘exists to make governmental action
possible [and] it trusts those who govern,’ while a constitution of limits ‘exists to
prevent governmental abuse, and distrusts those who govern.’”92 This views the
Constitution as a document that establishes powers for each branch of government,
but also places limits on the authority of each branch.
Despite following a more traditional model for my study, Parry‐Giles’s focus
on ideology in the Constitution is instructive. According to Stephen Bygrave, all of
Burke’s work centers on ideology. In particular, Burke’s notion of the constitution
beneath the constitution allows for the analysis of ideology.93 Robert Wess takes
Bygrave’s ideas further, arguing that for Burke, ideology is a struggle for definition.
Every act of constitution is a response, but it selects elements of past constitutions,
actively redefining the scene to which it responds. The act of selection thereby
reconstituting its own foundations.”94 Henry L. Ewbank adds:
More precisely, the Constitution is only a part of the constantly changing
scene that includes a great many other important details which provide
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motives for action—as well as decisions not to act—of the humans who
inhabit the scene. These other scenic aspects identify a context, or a larger
circumference. They include social, economic, and political realities that
determine the ways in which the language of the Constitution is
interpreted…95
But even though the language of the Constitution can be interpreted differently
based on a shifting circumference, the Constitution provides a vocabulary, or
terministic screen, which limits and guides the actors operating within this scene.
The Constitution is “an act so comprehensive that it set up and defined the overall
motivational scene, in terms of which countless personal acts of its citizens would
be both performed and judged.”96 Actors take action based on their understanding
of the Constitution, and courts then judge their constitutionality, determining—and
in some cases reshaping—the scene.
Robert Wade Kenny outlines a model for understanding Burke’s concept of
constitution and a way of applying it to legal discourse. He argues that whenever
symbolic action occurs, a descriptive constitution and a declared constitution are
present. Descriptive constitutions name things, while declared constitutions
command responsibility. Implicitly, descriptive constitutions call forth certain
declared constitutions. Kenny writes, “In Burke’s own words, instead of calling a
man ‘by nature a criminal,’ you say, ‘he will end on the gallows.’”97 Thus, a
descriptive constitution, or naming, symbolically “engineer[s] for the sake of a
forthcoming (motive)” or declared constitution.98
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Kenny argues that the nexus of the two types of constitution represents the
point of interplay between scene/act as well. Because the Constitution was
conceived in ambiguous terms that can be conflicting, “the law that frustrates one
wish in the Constitution will, by the same token, gratify another.”99 At the point of
tension between scene and act, the courts “contrive to articulate as if [a court
decision] straightens, rather than bends the document.”100 As a result the
Constitution is treated as descriptive though it was originally declared, allowing the
document to transform over time.101 As case law accumulates, it provides a variety
of precedents for judges to draw from, allowing them to reshape the scene
depending on the cases they choose to privilege.102 By examining the legal
reasoning of the court and its choice of cases, a critic can look at ideology in the
“constitution underneath the constitution”103 at the nexus of scene and act. To shift
to McGee’s terminology, looking at ideographs through Kenny’s reading of Burke, I
can determine how a court decision privileges a specific synchronic meaning of an
ideograph, which influences the diachronic shifts in the ideograph’s meaning.
To examine the ideology embedded in the FISCR opinion, the remainder of
this chapter will analyze the word clusters surrounding the terms privacy and
national security as they operate within Burke’s pentad. The clusters will expose
how the language and cases chosen to support the decision privilege an ideology
and reshape the scene, possibly leading to a change in the synchronic relationship
between the two terms’ meaning.
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Pentadic Analysis of the FISCR Opinion
Burke developed dramatism to analyze and critique human action by
revealing motive. Burke bases the method of inquiry on a pentad: scene, agent,
agency, purpose, and act. Scene refers to the setting or in which the other variables
of the pentad function. Agent is the object or character. Agency is the means to act.
Purpose is the intent with which an agent acts, and act is the action an agent
chooses.104 In the FISCR opinion, the United States government is the agent, and the
purpose is to strengthen national security. The FISCR sets a scene in which
terrorists threaten the United States in a setting where legal precedents, such as the
Fourth Amendment, constrain response options. The government carries out
foreign intelligence surveillance by directing and certifying communication service
providers to assist in the surveillance process. The following will explore each
element of the pentad indicating how the court’s choice of language is revealing
about its intent.
Agent
Referenced forty‐nine times, government is the primary actor in the case.
Despite the number of mentions, government is never explicitly defined. The FISCR
three times calls it the “executive” and refers to numerous agencies, including the
Department of Defense, National Security Agency, and Department of Justice. It also
names two individual actors: the Attorney General and the Director of National
Intelligence. The variety of groups and people associated with “government”
presents a sprawling body. However, the FISCR reduces the interest of the
government to military and legal matters by explicitly mentioning only the DNI and
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AG. By focusing on only these two aspects, the FISCR chooses not to acknowledge
other functions of the government, such as taxation, building infrastructure, or
providing assistance to citizens in need. The implication is that the government is
concerned only with the legality of its actions and how it can further the goals of the
military.
The FISCR presents the government as a powerful entity with authority. It
has the ability to send “directives” and issue “certifications,” which allow the
government to force a “communications service provider” to help the government
conduct warrantless surveillance. The text of the opinion identifies the government
as the “appropriate officials”105 with the power to “command”106 surveillance and
“compel compliance.”107 Though the petitioner appealed the government’s directive
and requested an injunction, the petitioner began compliance “under threat of civil
contempt.”108 The FISCR constitutes the government as having the authority to
coerce businesses like communication service providers into assisting even in cases
where they are unwilling to participate.
Act
The FISCR presents “foreign intelligence surveillance” as the act of the
government in the opinion, referencing the term thirty times. The language in the
opinion suggests that the surveillance was “warrantless,”109 but that it was also
“lawful”110 and “reasonable.”111 However, the term most frequently associated with
surveillance is “foreign intelligence,” which limits the scope of the surveillance.
Mentioned 26 times, “foreign intelligence” is strongly associated with
“national security.” The FISCR introduces the case as dealing with “foreign
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intelligence surveillance.”112 The court elaborated, writing that “obtain[ing] foreign
intelligence for national security purposes when those surveillances are directed
against foreign powers or agents of foreign powers reasonably believed to be
located outside the United States.”113 The object of surveillance is “foreign
agents,”114 “foreign powers,”115 or their “collaborators.”116 These words legitimize
the government’s actions, and even open up the possibility of domestic surveillance
with the mention of “collaborators.” The Protect America Act, which is the
legislation in question in this opinion, allowed the government to conduct
warrantless surveillance as long as a “significant purpose of that surveillance was to
obtain foreign intelligence information.”117 Foreign intelligence represents an
indirect object, result or type of surveillance for the FISCR. These quotes indicate
that as long as foreign intelligence targeting a foreign agent or power is a partial
motive for their surveillance, a warrant is not necessary.
Scene
The opinion takes place in a post‐September 11 context. The terror attack
and the subsequent reaction by the government heightened the focus on national
security. The passage of the PATRIOT Act and the Protect America Act altered the
legal landscape by lowering the standards for warrants for wiretaps when foreign
intelligence was concerned.
The FISCR considers the Fourth Amendment and its warrant requirement as
scenic conditions in its opinion. The FISCR presents the Fourth Amendment and
warrants, which are aligned with privacy, as obstacles to gathering foreign
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intelligence for national security. The government offers a foreign intelligence
exception as a challenge to the Fourth Amendment.
Mentioned nineteen times, Fourth Amendment acts as a protection to
privacy. In the introduction the court writes, “At its most elemental level, the
petition requires us to weigh the nation’s security interests against the Fourth
Amendment privacy interests of the United States.”118 The FISCR places national
security against privacy, and the Fourth Amendment provides the Constitutional
backing for privacy. The court contends that government intrusion on privacy must
“comport with the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement.”119 Explicitly,
the court adds, “The Fourth Amendment protects the right ‘to be secure…against
unreasonable searches and seizures.’”120 Because the court places privacy and
national security as polar opposites, these two quotes align the Fourth Amendment
with reasonableness and national security with searches and seizures.
Aligned with the Fourth Amendment and privacy is the term “warrant,”
which is referenced twenty‐one times. According to the FISCR, “The [petitioner]
asserts that the government…had to abide by the requirements attendant to the
Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment.” Initially, the FISCR presents the
Warrant Clause as a particular protection in the Fourth Amendment that prohibits
the government from encroaching on citizens’ privacy. Traditional warrant
requirements include “prior judicial review, probable cause, and particularity.”121
The language of the term “warrant” and its attendant requirements limit
surveillance and narrow its scope, placing it in opposition to word clusters around
“national security.” Indeed, the FISCR writes, “…there is a high degree of probability
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that requiring a warrant would hinder the government’s ability to collect time‐
sensitive information and, thus, would impede the vital national security interests
that are at stake.”122 The term “warrant” forces the court to consider probable
cause and particularity against gathering time‐sensitive information.
While the petitioner contends that the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause
should be privileged, the government agonistically argues that a “foreign
intelligence” exception to the Fourth Amendment exists, which allows warrantless
surveillance. The court compares foreign intelligence to cases where the Fourth
Amendment has been waived, writing, “Applying principles derived from the special
needs cases, we conclude that this type of foreign intelligence surveillance possesses
characteristics that qualify it for such an exception.”123 Supporting this judgment
and dismissing an argument of the petitioner, the court writes, “The prevention or
apprehension of terrorism suspects, for instance, is inextricably intertwined with
the national security concerns that are at the core of foreign intelligence
collection.”124 The FISCR concludes that because of the intensity of governmental
claims of national security, a foreign intelligence exception must exist as a special
needs case. By granting that a foreign intelligence exception exists in “special
needs” cases, the FISCR further develops a conception of privacy as contextual. The
implication of exception is that privacy exists until the government claims an
intense interest, such as national security.
The FISCR’s case for exception is significant particularly because it excludes
legal arguments from previous privacy cases that rejected such reasoning. In the
first major wiretapping case, Olmstead v. United States in 1928, the Supreme Court
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upheld wiretapping, but Louis Brandeis wrote a much‐cited dissent. Besides his
Constitutional objection to invasions of privacy, Brandeis specifically attacked
wiretapping and agents engaging in it. Brandeis wrote, “The greatest dangers to
liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well‐meaning but without
understanding.”125 Brandeis contended that in the hands of these men wiretapping
was a much greater threat than tampering with mail. “As a means of espionage,
writs of assistance and general warrants are but puny instruments of tyranny and
oppression when compared with wiretapping,” he wrote.126 His main objection was
that a wiretap invades the privacy of whoever is on the line with the person under
surveillance, as well. In his dissent, Justice Butler agreed, writing that privileged
communications between doctors and patients, husbands and wives, etc. take place
over the phone.127
In 1965 the Supreme Court officially recognized the right to privacy in
Griswold v. Connecticut as a fundamentally human right older than the Constitution.
Justice Douglas wrote, “We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights …
It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not
political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an
association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.”128 This
case not only recognized privacy, but privileged it as noble purpose, not a contextual
concern.
Overturning the Olmstead decision in 1967, Katz v. United States explicitly
stated the wiretapping without a warrant was illegal. In opposition to Olmstead,
which ruled that intrusion protected a place, Justice Stewart wrote, “The Fourth
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Amendment protects people, not places.”129 The court held that a conversation in a
phone booth should be private, and “The Government's activities in electronically
listening to and recording the petitioner's words violate the privacy upon which he
justifiably relied while using the telephone booth.”130 This case expanded the
definition of privacy applying to individuals, not just domiciles. These cases
represent just a few notable examples of definitions of privacy that the FISCR
excludes when developing its exception to the Fourth Amendment and its warrant
clause.
Additionally, the FISCR is excluding the philosophical foundations of privacy
that explains why other judges support a strong definition of privacy. The
petitioner’s claim that the intrusion is not reasonable recalls Warren and Brandeis’s
definition of privacy as an “inviolate personality.”131 Though Warren and Brandeis
were concerned about an aggressive press and this case deals with government
intrusion, Warren and Brandeis provide the foundation for both, writing, “The
common law has always recognized a man’s home as his castle, impregnable, often,
even to its own officers engaged in the execution of its commands. Shall the courts
thus close the front entrance to constituted authority, and open wide the back door
to idle or prurient curiosity?”132 Similar to the press peeping in the back door is the
government listening in on the phone lines or looking at emails.
Another privacy scholar attempted to define Warren and Brandeis’s vague
but central term “inviolate personality.” Edward Bloustein wrote a law review
article that argued an intrusion of privacy was an assault on human personality.
Bloustein shifts the interests of privacy remedies from mental distress or
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proprietary concerns to an affront against human dignity, which diverges
significantly from the FISCR conception of privacy as a contextual variable.133 In an
attempt to justify the right to privacy, a number of scholars attempted to link
privacy with another, more basic, value.134
By excluding these former definitions of privacy, the FISCR treated the
Fourth Amendment as a contextual variable, which implies that privacy exists only
situationally. The FISCR argues that government surveillance must comport with
the Fourth Amendment, but then it writes that “the greater the government’s
interest, the greater the intrusion that may be constitutionally tolerated.”135 The
FISCR argues that “individual interests” are balanced against “governmental
interests” with the scales “tilt[ing] in favor of upholding the government’s actions” if
the interests are sufficiently supported.136 By initially arguing that governmental
action must comport with the Fourth Amendment, and then saying that government
interest is balanced against individual privacy, the FISCR implies that the Fourth
Amendment is a contextual variable. Thus, individual privacy rights exist only when
the government deems they do.
Agency
The FISCR identifies the agency to be the means the United States
government uses to implement foreign intelligence surveillance. Specifically, the
government issues directives, which are supported by certifications, to the
communications service providers. The service provider is, in turn, compelled to
assist the government in surveillance of the service provider’s customers.
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First, the government’s authority allows it to “issue directives to the
petitioner commanding”137 the communications service provider to begin
surveillance of its customers. It is through these directives, mentioned twenty‐nine
times, that the government exercises its authority. As such, the directives are the
point of contention when the communications service provider challenges their
“legality.”138 However, the court rules that the directives are “lawful and that
compliance is obligatory,”139 based on the certifications that accompany the
directives.
Second, the FISCR establishes that certifications, as a form of agency, provide
“protections”140 and “safeguards”141 to any potential abuse of warrantless
surveillance. Based on these protections that are referenced 10 times, the FISCR
argued that, “in essence…certifications permit surveillance conducted to obtain
foreign intelligence for national security.”142 The FISCR enunciates specific
protections in place, citing “procedures” and “affidavits.” According to the court,
each directive had “a written certification ‘supported as appropriate by affidavit of
appropriate officials in the national security field.’”143 The court adds, “The
procedures incorporated through the section 2.5 of Executive Order 12333, made
applicable to the surveillance through certifications and directives, serve to allay the
probable cause concern.”144 Further supporting this, the court writes, “in order for
the government to act upon the certifications, the Attorney General first had to
make a determination that probable cause existed.”145 By including verifications
and affidavits from “appropriate officials,” the certifications serve to support the
legality of directives ordering surveillance by communications service providers.
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Last, the directives “direct the communications service provider to assist [the
government] in acquiring foreign intelligence.”146 “Assistance” and “acquisition” are
the two words most commonly linked with communications service provider,
relegating the service provider to a tool of the federal government. In this case, the
communications service provider is noted only seven times, all in the early
background section of the opinion. From then on, the FISCR refers to the
communication service provider only as the petitioner. Though the
communications service provider is challenging the government using them as a
tool for surveillance, the name given, petitioner, conjures the image of someone
requesting to be heard rather than someone one with equal footing.
Purpose
For the FISCR, strengthening national security is the purpose. When writing
about national security as a government interest, the FISCR argues that “the more
important the government’s interest, the greater the intrusion that may be
constitutionally tolerated.”147 For the court, the importance of the nation’s security
interest is paramount. And the FISCR defines national security as “an interest of
utmost significance.”148 The court adds, “the interest of national security is of the
highest order of magnitude.”149 In cases where national security is the purpose, “the
constitutional scales will tip in favor of upholding the government’s actions.”150 In
FISCR’s conclusion, which notably mentions national security four times while
referencing privacy only once, the FISCR writes:
[T]he Constitution is the cornerstone of our freedoms, and the government
cannot unilaterally sacrifice constitutional rights on the altar of national
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security…Our decision recognizes that where the government has instituted
several layers of serviceable safeguards to protect individuals against
unwarranted harms and to minimize incidental intrusions, its efforts to
protect national security should not be frustrated by the courts.151
Despite denying that the government can take unilateral action, the court places
itself as subservient to the government for national security cases, effectively
arguing that an avenue for recourse for citizen’s whose rights been violated should
not exist in matters of national security. Rather than protecting the rights of
Americans through national security, the FISCR constitutes national security as the
ultimate purpose. Instead of presenting national security as a means of protecting
rights, the FISCR places national security as the end goal of the legal system, which
minimizes recourse for aggrieved citizens and opens the United States to abuses by
“men of zeal, well‐meaning but without understanding.”
Conclusions
To this point, the analysis has established that the government is an
authoritative agent that can command within legal boundaries to protect the
nation’s security. The government’s action is surveillance of possible threats to the
community as long as gathering foreign intelligence is a significant purpose. The
tools, or agencies, used to gather surveillance are directives supported by
certifications that compel communications service providers to assist the
government. The scene is governed by a threat to national security, and in that
context the Fourth Amendment becomes not a protection of privacy, but an obstacle
to national security. When the action is combating a threat from terrorists, the
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FISCR granted a “special needs” foreign intelligence exception to the Fourth
Amendment, which circumvented the warrant requirement.
In this case, the FISCR develops a descriptive constitution that protected
national security interests rather than privacy concerns, concluding that the
government intrusion was reasonable. By naming an exception to the Fourth
Amendment, the court is establishing a descriptive constitution—or scene—in
which the government has the power to engage in warrantless wiretapping in cases
of special needs. As detailed above, the FISCR cited cases that supported a foreign
intelligence exception while excluding those that did not. The declared constitution
reshapes the constitutional scene by justifying government actions such as
wiretapping by naming that activity an exception in the descriptive constitution.
Further, the government, through certifications, controls much of the information
that determines the intensity of a case.
Just as important as the implications of the descriptive and declared
constitutions outlined by the FISCR are the motives behind the decision. To access
the constitution beneath the constitution and look at the ideology driving this
decision, an examination of the ideographs is helpful. The FISCR pits privacy against
national security in the introduction of this case. Mentioned eight times, the FISCR
places privacy in an inferior role to national security—mentioned fourteen times—
in number of references and gravity of references. In one instance, the FISCR writes
an entire section about the merits of privacy only to conclude that governmental
interest in national security trumped the Fourth Amendment. In the conclusion, the
FISCR refers to national security four times more than privacy, and rules that the
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government’s efforts to protect national security should not be frustrated by the
courts. The court is describing its decision as a matter of protecting national
security, and any other decision would jeopardize “the safety and security of its
people.”152 The court notes that the executive cannot “unilaterally sacrifice
constitutional rights on the altar of national security.”153 However, by establishing
an exception to the Fourth Amendment and arguing for limiting the Amendment’s
application, the FISCR reduces the scope of the meaning of privacy established in
earlier cases.
The FISCR presents this case as straightening constitutionality, not bending
it. By structuring their legal reasoning to provide for an exception to the Fourth
Amendment, the FISCR’s descriptive constitution calls forth a declared constitution
that allows for warrantless wiretapping. Basing their descriptive constitution on
national security grounds and excluding significant privacy cases demonstrates the
ideology at work in the constitution beneath the constitution.
By establishing the constitutionality of the government’s surveillance of its
citizens, the FISCR attempts to reshape the constitutional scene by constituting
privacy as contextual. It presents the Fourth Amendment and its warrant
requirement as an obstacle to protecting national security, rather than protecting
the rights of individuals. Choosing its precedents, the FISCR establishes a foreign
intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment, allowing the government to
conduct warrantless surveillance.
Examining the constitution beneath the constitution reveals that by making
national security the purpose of the government, the FISCR elevates it above privacy
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as an ideograph. In fact, the FISCR presents the ideographs as terms that are in
competition, which means the terms are always dissonant. The court offers little
hope reconciling the tension between the terms; instead it privileged national
security.
The decision constitutes a community that looks at national security rather
than at rights or freedoms as the ultimate purpose. It minimizes recourse for
violations of rights when national security is invoked, and elevates national security
to an “exceptional” term. This diachronic expansion of the meaning of national
security represents a danger for the community. A term so ideologically charged
could justify curtailing a wide range of liberties in favor of national security.
Particularly for minorities and immigrants an expansion in the meaning of national
security poses problems, such as deportation and detention.
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CHAPTER 3
STATE SECRETS, REDACTION, AND SILENCE
Silence serves a multitude of purposes in rhetoric: a tool for survival, a path
to liberation, and an exercise of power on a group. Silence allows for ambiguity of
meaning, which is, in turn, interpreted by listeners. The words that bracket silence
shape its potential meaning by suggesting to a listener what should fill the silence or
hint at the meaning that should be attributed to the silence. Language bracketing a
silence can exercise influence over its potential meaning because terms, particularly
those that encompass ideological freight, can persuade a specific construction of
meaning. Audiences fill in their expectations from the rhetorical context, with
community‐understood norms central to the process.
For this chapter, I will examine redaction as a form of silence. To gain a
better understanding of how ideology shapes the meaning of silence, I will look at
word clusters bracketing the redactions in the FISCR opinion. Redactions in the
opinion represent information the court has chosen to silence. Because the opinion
is about government surveillance of citizens, the words that cluster around the
redactions are intimately related to privacy and national security. Analyzing those
clusters will yield understanding about the interaction between the ideographs, as
well as how ideology helps shape the meaning of silence. The chapter will review
the literature on silence to glean approaches for critically analyzing silence, place
the FISCR document in historical context to best understand how situational
circumstances may have affected the use of silence in the document, and analyze
word clusters bracketing the redactions in the FISCR opinion for the purpose of
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better understanding the synchronic relationship between the ideographs
<privacy> and <national security>.
The Scholarship on Silence
The question of the role of silence in communication has generated research
across a multitude of fields. In the arena of communication studies, Robert
Johannesen’s 1974 survey of literature on silence sparked much of the current
research on the topic. He argues that, “. . . sound and silence define each other.
Silence takes on meaning only in a surrounding context of verbal and nonverbal
signals.”154 Focusing on interpersonal communication, Johannesen points out that
humans “. . . cannot not communicate,” thus silence will carry meaning regardless of
intention. 155 He lists at least 20 meanings that could be attached to silence based on
prior experience and cultural conditioning.156 Robert Scott provides a more
succinct list, writing that silence can be a mark of respect or awe.157 It can
symbolize obedience, attention, and contemplation.158
Scott also contends that silence can be threatening.159 Indeed, Johannesen
reiterates that silence often is considered antisocial, citing what Baker calls a
“negative silence” motivated by fear or insecurity.160 This development in the
literature offers important background for this study because of the nature of the
redactions in the FISCR opinion. Depending on the perspective of those interpreting
the FISCR opinion, the silences can be viewed as a negative because they threaten
privacy or as a positive because protect national security.
A number of scholars have argued that silence, particularly when infused
with ideology, has political implications. Radha S. Hegde and Lester Olson focus not
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just on the political meaning of silence, but also on the ideological and cultural
factors contributing to that meaning. Hegde’s ethnographic interviews with
battered women in a shelter in India reveal a deep‐rooted paternalism that led to
silence.161 Similar to this study, Hegde analyzes the language around silences to
determine the ideological factors that indicate and influence the meaning of silence.
At least two scholars have argued that silence represents an exercise of
power on minority groups. Lester Olson examines a speech by poet Audre Lorde,
concluding that silence can be imposed on disenfranchised groups.162 His study is
primarily concerned with the way power can be exercised through silence.
Similarly, Dana Cloud looks at a 1934 mill strike in which white workers discovered
an avenue to voice their displeasure. However, the black workers learned to keep
their silence because oppression by a paternalistic power structure could lead to
racial violence.163
While the previously discussed authors added to the theory of silence, Barry
Brummett provides a blueprint for analyzing what he calls a “strategic silence.”164
Strategic silence must 1) violate expectations, 2) draw public attribution of
predictable meaning, and 3) seem intentional and directed at an audience.165 While
interpersonal silence can take on a multiplicity of meanings, Brummett argues that
strategic silence actually evokes predictable meanings, but audiences frequently
interpret strategic silence as mystery, uncertainty, passivity, and relinquishment.166
In his example on Jimmy Carter, Brummett notes that by relinquishing control, a
politician allows for unchecked speculation and avenues for others to define the
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situation.167 Thus, for Brummett, relinquishing control of meaning‐making must be
a desirable action for a strategic silence to be an effective decision.
Brummett, however, rules out what he calls “explained silences” as part of his
strategic silence framework.168 He writes, “If the President adequately explains the
silence as required by national security, then the public comes to expect silence as
appropriate in that instance.”169 I contend that even if the redaction in the FISCR
opinion is a silence explained by national security, the content of what the opinion is
silent on is just as strategic as any other silence. The FISCR redactions represent
explained silences in the opinion. Additionally, an explained silence provides an
opportunity to examine how ideology can shape the meaning of silence.
Judicial Justification for Silence
The legal justification for redaction in the national security context is the
states secret privilege, which is a common law principle that allows the government
to withhold information based on protection of U.S. citizens and property. It is an
evidentiary rule that “protects information from discovery when disclosure would
be inimical to the national security.”170 In essence, it allows the government to
silence others by claiming silence. Redaction and states secrets can provide a point
of tension between national security and privacy where the ability to claim silence is
power.
Two cases provide an early foundation for the principle: United States v. Burr
and Totten v. United States. In Aaron Burr’s 1807 trial for treason, Chief Justice
Marshall wrote that if a letter under subpoena, “contain[s] any matter which it
would be imprudent to disclose, which it is not the wish of the executive to disclose,
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such matter, if it be not immediately and essentially applicable to the point, will, of
course, be suppressed."171 Chief Justice Marshall was skeptical of the rule and wrote
that it should be narrowly used, but supported granting the executive the discretion
bar information coming to trial based on state secrets.
In Totten v. United States, the Supreme Court case that set the precedent for
the modern application of the state secrets privilege, the estate of a former spy sued
the government for the enforcement of a contract signed by Abraham Lincoln during
the Civil War. The court found:
The service stipulated by the contract was a secret service; the information
sought was to be obtained clandestinely, and was to be communicated
privately; the employment and the service were to be equally concealed.
Both employer and agent must have understood that the lips of the other
were to be forever sealed respecting the relation of either to the matter. This
condition of the engagement was implied from the nature of the employment,
and is implied in all secret employments of the government in time of war, or
upon matters affecting our foreign relations, where a disclosure of the
service might compromise or embarrass our government in its public duties,
or endanger the person or injure the character of the agent.172
The court makes it clear that especially in times of war, the government has the legal
right to invoke state secrets when the government might be “embarrassed” or
disclosures could endanger an agent. A number of years passed before courts dealt
with another significant state secrets case, leaving these two cases as legal
precedent for the government’s claims.
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During 1900s a number of cases tested the state secrets privilege. The
results fleshed out what the state secrets privilege covers, why it exists, and the
limits on the privilege. The 1998 Kasza v. Browner case, which made it to the federal
appeals court, issues a definitive ruling on the state secrets privilege explaining the
limits of the state secrets privilege when invoked by the government. The case
established that the state secrets privilege can 1) remove evidence from
consideration, 2) deprive the defendant of information that would validate a
defense, and 3) dismiss the case because it’s very subject matter is a state secret.173
Based on the breadth and intensity of information involved in a case, the state
secrets privilege can do as little as bar evidence from consideration, but can go as far
as completely dismissing a case. Additionally, Halkin v. Helms provides a precedent
in which a federal appeals court ruled that the states secrets privilege is an
overriding principle. The court argues that when related to state secrets, a case “is
not a balancing of ultimate interests at stake in the litigation."174 Instead, it requires
a showing of harm that could result from disclosing information.175 Without a
significant harm determined by the court, an entire case can be dismissed based on
state secrets as well.
The Supreme Court first reinforced the early decisions on the reasons for the
existence of the state secrets privilege in the 1953 United States v. Reynolds case. A
military aircraft crashed killing three, and a widow sued for damages. Ultimately,
the court refused to allow discovery, writing that if “reasonable danger that
compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest of
national security, [it] should not be divulged."176 While the Totten v. United States
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case argues that the government had an interest in protecting its secrets during
times of war, the Reynolds v. United States case expands the privilege to protecting
all national security secrets that could expose military matters.
In 1978 the U.S. Court of Appeals elaborated on the conclusions in the
Reynolds case in Halkin v. Helms. Vietnam war protesters accused the NSA of illegal
wiretapping with the cooperation of communication providers through operations
MINARET and SHAMROCK. The government argues that the state secrets privilege
applied because litigation could “"(1) confirm the identity of individuals or
organizations whose foreign communications were acquired by NSA, (2) disclose
the dates and contents of such communications, or (3) divulge the methods and
techniques by which the communications were acquired by NSA." 177 Despite an
enormous amount of disclosure about SHAMROCK in Congressional testimony, the
court argues that “even ‘seemingly innocuous’ information is privileged if that
information is part of a classified ‘mosaic’ that ‘can be analyzed and fitted into place
to reveal with startling clarity how the unseen whole must operate.’”178 Taken with
Reynolds, the court asserts that the government should be given broad discretion to
apply state secrets particularly in military matters. Such latitude is warranted
because the identities, dates, and techniques could be divulged, and agents of
foreign powers could use it as counterintelligence to subvert national security.
A few court cases have attempted to define the limits of the state secrets
privilege. In United States v. Reynolds, the Supreme Court notes that judicial control
should not be ceded to executive “caprice,” but it does not provide explicit
circumstances under which the executive has proved invoking state secrets is
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necessary.179 In Ellsberg v. Mitchell, the United States Appeals court upheld the
assertion of the state secrets privilege. However, it writes, “Whenever possible,
sensitive information must be disentangled from non‐sensitive information to allow
for the release of the latter."180 Additionally, the court, in a case related to the
government application for two wiretaps without warrants, reaffirms that the
burden for an exemption from the Fourth Amendment is on those seeking it. These
two cases limit the state secrets privilege by requiring it to comport with the Fourth
Amendment unless the government presents a compelling reason, and it requires
the government to release any information that is non‐sensitive rather than trying
to shield an entire case from litigation.
The common law state secrets privilege warrants withholding evidence and
even precluding a trial from reaching court. As noted in Totten, the state secrets
privilege is particularly relevant during times of war and crisis. It is tightly tied to
the protection of national security, and cases like Halkin v. Helms and the Keith case
led to the development of FISA and the FISCR. The courts, in short, have historically
recognized the power of the executive to take extreme action when national security
is threatened.
Executive/Legislative Justifications for Silence
While the judiciary affected the FISCR opinion through state secrets privilege,
the executive and the legislature also influenced the context in which the case took
place. Two historical developments that significantly influenced the FISCR when
ruling on In re Directives were the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP) and the
Protect America Act (PAA). Public outrage at the TSP program led to the passage of
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the Protect America Act, which provided the executive with legislation to support
activities that were formerly undertaken through the TSP. The FISCR ruling on In re
Directives was based on its interpretation of the PAA statutes, with many of the
court’s justifications grounded in references to the legislation. Because the TSP and
the PAA played a considerable role in the circumstantial development of the case
and later the legal reasoning that legitimized the government’s surveillance, a brief
review of the two measures is relevant to my analysis. This section will describe the
TSP and its duties, document the public outrage, and explain the passage of the PAA.
On December 16, 2005, The New York Times revealed the existence of a
domestic surveillance program related to the War on Terror. According to the
article:
Under a presidential order signed in 2002, the intelligence agency monitored
the international telephone calls and international e‐mail messages of
hundreds, perhaps thousands, of people inside the United States without
warrants over the past three years in an effort to track possible "dirty
numbers" linked to Al Qaeda, the officials said. The agency, they said, still
seeks warrants to monitor entirely domestic communications.181
The White House requested the New York Times kill the article because it could
jeopardize national security investigations.182 The following day, George Bush
addressed the nation, saying:
I authorized the National Security Agency, consistent with U.S. law and the
Constitution, to intercept the international communications of people with
known links to al Qaeda and related terrorist organizations. Before we
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intercept these communications, the government must have information that
establishes a clear link to these terrorist networks.183
Bush said the program was “crucial to our national security” and the newspaper’s
disclosure threatened citizens. NSA whistleblower Russell Tice said that some
employees worried the warrantless program was illegal.184 He also claimed that the
program affected millions of Americans185. A subsequent USA Today story reported
that AT&T, MCI, and Sprint were the communications service providers that assisted
the government in the surveillance.186
In the wake of the controversy, the Bush administration submitted the
Protect America Act bill to Congress on July 28, 2007. The bill passed only six days
later. The Protect America Act established that surveillance could take place inside
the United States as long as it was not targeted at a particular person.187 It also
adopted the PATRIOT Act’s lowered standard of intelligence gathering as
“significant” instead of the “primary” purpose of the surveillance. Formerly, that
meant that intelligence gathering was the only goal of surveillance. Substituting
“significant” for “primary” meant that the government can conduct surveillance for
law enforcement purposes as well. The bill was only active for a six‐month period,
but the FISA Amendment Act reauthorized many of the PAA’s provisions, including
all of the above‐mentioned changes.188
The details on the TSP reported by the national media launched numerous
lawsuits through state and federal courts alleging privacy violations.189 The
majority of the lawsuits were initially dismissed by the state secrets privilege.190 All
of these cases dealt with communications providers assisting the government in
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surveillance for national security. In most, an individual or group representing
privacy rights sued either the government or a service provider for privacy
violations. The case analyzed in this study stems from the same controversy, with
the notable difference that the communication service provider appealed on behalf
of its customers to FISA insisting that surveillance was an unconstitutional invasion
of privacy.
The FISCR Opinion
In the nearly 40 years of the FISCR’s existence, it has published only two
opinions: In re Sealed Case191 and In re Directives. In the In re Directives case, Judge
Bruce Selya argues that it was in the public’s interest to have access to the court’s
findings, but declined to specify its reasons for its ruling. Despite publishing the
opinion, the court is cautious about revealing too much information to the general
public. Judge Selya writes, “This Court shall act on any request to disclose court
records or other documents containing classified information anent this case only
after consultation with the Executive branch.”192 Within the public decision, the
court relies heaving on redaction to restrict access to what it considers necessary to
protect the nation. The court explicitly notes that it will protect “…the identity of the
petitioner and the intelligence sources and methods at issue.”193 Examination of the
introductions and conclusions to the redactions, however, is revealing.
The following will identify the five types of information that the FISCR
redacted, namely, the name of the communications service provider, the names of
the customers the provider wiretapped, the dates on which surveillance took place,
the procedures relating to intelligence activities, and the criticisms of the
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surveillance practices. Within the discussion of each information type, it will offer
the findings of the related cluster analysis, identify the explicit justifications used by
the court for the use of redactions, and offer implications of decisions regarding the
information appropriate for the public sphere.
The Petitioner
As the publication order points out, the name of the petitioner is redacted.
The formal name of the case is In re Directives [redacted text]. Throughout the
document, the FISCR refers to the service provider only as the petitioner. The court
identifies the petitioner in the first sentence of the opinion, writing, “This petition
for review stems from directives issued to the petitioner [redacted text] pursuant to
a now expired set of amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.”194
The name of the service provider is never mentioned again.
The court does not offer any reasons for redacting the name of the service
provider. However, redacting the name of the service provider invites the reader to
assume the redaction was a security measure for the service provider and the public
for several reasons. First, revealing the name of the service provider could open it
to the liability of lawsuits and losing customers. For instance, when the TSP story
broke, at least two cases, Hepting v. AT&T and Terkel v. AT&T, were filed against
service providers. The negative press surrounding wiretapping could also lead
customers to switch to a service provider that might not be cooperating with the
government or to render the service provider the target of a potential terrorist
attack. Terrorists often target those perceived to be assisting the government. For
example, the Taliban has targeted American and Afghan civilians asserting they
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were working with the government.195 Last, providing the name of the service
provider could frustrate the government’s efforts to catch terrorists. Judge Vaughn
Walker outlines the security issue in Hepting v. AT&T, writing, “In short, when
deciding what communications channel to use, a terrorist ‘balanc[es] the risk that a
particular method of communication will be intercepted against the operational
inefficiencies of having to use ever more elaborate ways to circumvent what he
thinks may be intercepted.’”196 While the first two scenarios for redacting the name
of the petitioner protect the service provider, the last one protects the public.
Redacting the service provider erases the responsibility by these actors in
the war on terrorism. Stuckey argues that history has demonstrated the plausibility
of such an interpretation when she maintains that William Taft was able to ignore
civil rights issues, mask regional divisions, and exclude specific groups from the
national identity by homogenizing all Americans.197 The redaction masks the
service provider, which may prompt future civil rights violations by removing public
scrutiny of potentially a wide range of actors, including businesses, groups of
individuals, or even individual actors.
The Customers
In addition to redacting the name of the service provider, the document
redacted the names of the customers the government wished to wiretap. Judge
Selya writes, “The government issued directives to the petitioner commanding it to
assist in the warrantless surveillance of certain customers [redacted text and
footnote]. These directives were issued pursuant to certifications that purported to
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contain all the information required by the PAA.”198 After redacting this early
mention, the court does not address customers again.
This redaction following “certain customers” invites readers to believe that
the court had information about the specific customers targeted and the redacted
footnote as containing an appropriate justification for their wiretap of those specific
customers. The sentence immediately following the redaction focuses on the
legality of the surveillance of these certain customers, relying on “certifications”
required by the PAA. The language around the redaction tempts readers to infer
that the names of these certain customers were redacted because they could file suit
against the service provider and government because of the surveillance. Or, the
government could still be monitoring these people as terrorist suspects.
Depending on the interpretation of the removed content, redacting customer
names arguably homogenizes the victims into a silent space that aligns them with a
threat to national security and denies them an identity. Writing about the Gulf War,
Winkler argues that categorizing Iraq under the general label “terrorist” allowed the
Bush administration to portray “the attack on one small country into a threat to all
the civilized nations of the world.”199 By constructing Iraq as a part of a collective
terrorist threat, the Bush administration attributed characteristics of irrationality
and desperation to the entire nation.200 Similarly, the FISCR frequently cites the
certifications and procedures in place to target only those suspected to be terrorist
agents of a foreign power. By denying the customers an identity and associating
them with a homogenous threat justifies redaction by fusing the customers with an
irrational enemy.
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The Chronology
The opinion also redacted chronology of events connected with the
surveillance under review by the court. When explaining the background of the
case, the opinion redacted at least four different dates. “On [redacted text], the
government moved to compel compliance.”201 “The FISC’s decision was docketed on
[redacted text]. Six business days later, the petitioner filed a petition for review.”202
The final redaction read, “On [redacted text], the petitioner began compliance under
the threat of civil contempt. [redacted text] On [redacted text], the petitioner
moved in this court for a stay pending appeal.”203 In the final redaction, at least an
entire sentence has been removed.
The court’s stated reason for these redactions was that they risked becoming
part of a “mosaic,” as noted in Halkin v. Helms, which could lend insight into how the
U.S. intelligence agencies operate. However, the PAA was signed into law on August
5, 2007, and its sunset was February 17, 2008. Readers knowledgeable about the
relevant time frame could assume that redacting the dates calls into question
whether the surveillance took place during those six months. The court so
thoroughly redacted the dates that the only indication of time is that “six business
days” after the FISC ruled on the case, the petitioner appealed to the FISCR.204
For readers that assume the surveillance happened outside the active period
of the PAA, the implication of these redactions is that the government knowingly
engaged in illegal wiretapping. In Totten v. United States, the court allows the
government to invoke state secrets to protect itself from “embarrassment” during
times of war. By redacting the dates, the government denies the public the ability to
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evaluate if the government’s surveillance activities were legal. It opens the
government to the possible interpretation that it used state secrets to redact the
dates to avoid embarrassment from the questionable legality of its actions.
More generally, silencing aspects of the scene alters the context in which
actions take place. By redacting chronology, the FISCR allows readers to speculate
on whether an action was illegal because of its timing. Scenic shifts dramatically
change how an action is interpreted. An action can be legal or illegal depending on
the scene in which it takes place, and by silencing elements of the scene the FISCR
denies readers the opportunity to make a well‐informed judgment.
The Surveillance Procedures
Intelligence‐gathering procedures are another textual grouping that the
court redacted. The opinion explains the procedures as minimizing harm and
protecting citizen rights, and at least seven redactions apply to these procedures:
This matrix of safeguards comprises at least five components: targeting
procedures, minimization procedures, a procedure to ensure a significant
purpose of a surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information,
procedures incorporated through Executive Order 12333, and [redacted
text] procedures [redacted text] outlined in an affidavit supporting the
certifications.205
Judge Selya outlines these safeguards in response to the petitioner’s complaint that
the surveillance lacked particularity. The FISCR rejected this claim, writing, “…the
[redacted text] procedures and the procedures incorporated through the Executive
Order are constitutionally sufficient compensation for any encroachments.”206 A
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further discussion of the procedures outlined in the certifications is provided, but in
a confidential government brief. To lend the certification further credibility, the
court notes that the Attorney General must sign off on the potential wiretapping.
For the FISCR, procedures represent a protection of privacy. The court
indicates “targeting,” “minimization,” and “certifications” procedures exist to buffer
privacy rights from aggressive national security interests. These terms imply that
any harm done by the surveillance will be limited. Additionally, the court argues the
procedures provide sufficient “compensation for any encroachments.” However, the
opinion redacts a number of the procedures. By silencing the procedures, readers
could infer that the opinion silences the very provisions present to protect privacy.
The government is able to silence the provisions because of its reliance on
certifications approved by “appropriate national security officials” and the Attorney
General. If such is the case, redacting the procedures reinforces the authority of the
government.
Readers could construe the implications of this set of redactions as allowing
the government to act any way it wishes if it has certifications. In this scenario, the
government’s need for “speed, stealth, and secrecy” in the protection of national
security silences concerns for individual privacy, particularly when procedures are
in place. Government interests in national security require the ability to “compel
compliance” from the service providers because of the gravity of national security
concerns. Failure to comply with a government request in this situation carries “a
threat of civil contempt,” and compliance must continue despite an appeal for a stay
regarding the surveillance. Despite the fact that “the government’s efforts did not
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impress the petitioner,”207 the service provider has no option but to assist the
government in surveillance of its customers because the procedures provide
sufficient compensation for encroachment.
Broadly, the procedures and certifications represent actions taken by the
government to ensure that the privacy of citizens is protected. By redacting
executive branch actions, the opinion arguably obscures the extent to which the
government protects privacy, instead replacing it with the government’s need to act
swiftly and silently. By silencing intelligence procedures, the FISCR denies the
reader knowledge of the full range of actions, and readers could assume that some
undertakings by actors are too secret for the general public to know. Silencing
allows actors to place deeds out of the public eye even if it directly involves aspects
of an individual’s life.
Criticisms of the PAA Surveillance
At least seven redactions seem to be criticisms of the surveillance or
potential errors that could result from the surveillance activities. In both number
and length, this category by far represents the most redactions. The petitioner
argues that the lack of judicial oversight could lead to mistakes in warrantless
wiretapping. The FISCR court rejects this claim on two grounds. It holds that the
previously discussed procedures were in place to prevent mistakes. Second, the
court writes, “’the government has the greatest need for speed, stealth, and secrecy’.
[redacted text] Compulsory compliance with the warrant requirement would
introduce an element of delay, thus frustrating the government’s ability to collect
information in a timely manner. [redacted text].”208 In another instance, when
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discussing potential errors, the court writes, “A prior judicial review process does
not ensure that the types of errors complained of here [redacted text] would have
been prevented.”209 During the same discussion, the court adds, “Similarly, the fact
that there is some potential for error is not sufficient reason to invalidate the
surveillances. [redacted text]. Equally as important, some risk of errors exists under
the original FISA procedures…”210 These two redactions invite readers to conclude
that the FISCR is redacting examples of the assertions they support.
All of the preceding quotes offer an assertion, and then the court redacts
what appear to be concrete examples supporting those assertions. For example, the
court’s language suggests a need for timeliness as a reason for dismissing the
warrant requirement, but then it redacts what could be interpreted as examples
supporting the need for “speed, stealth, and secrecy.” The following sentence
stresses the dangers of compulsory compliance with a warrant requirement, and
then redacts what appear to be examples that prove the claim.
In instances where the petitioner complains of possible privacy violations,
the government makes a rebutting claim, but the court redacts the examples that
possibly support its claim. By redacting the examples supporting the assertions, the
court denies readers the opportunity to judge the applicability of the claims. In
effect, the court could be seen as silencing criticisms of errors by denying readers
access to the examples that support the government.
In addition to redacting examples that support the government, readers
could assume that the FISCR redacts entire arguments that the petitioner makes.
Following a lengthy discussion of procedures that minimize risk, the court writes,
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“[redacted text and footnote] The petitioner’s additional criticisms about the
surveillance can be grouped into concerns about potential abuse of executive
discretion and concerns about the risk of government error…”211 Similarly, an entire
section, which Judge Selya titles “A Parting Shot,” deals with an argument made
during the appeal hearing by the petitioner. The court provides a cryptic summary,
dismissing the argument:
We need not probe that point, however, because the petitioner is firing
blanks: no issue falling within this description has arisen to date. Were such
an issue to arise, there are safeguards in place that may meet the
reasonableness standard. We do, however, direct the government promptly
to notify the petitioner if this issue arises under the directives.212
Other than this summary, the entire section is redacted, reserved only for the
classified version of the document. Both of these redactions remove significant
portions of text, making it difficult to deduce what potential issues or criticisms are
under discussion.
The phrase “additional criticisms” following the first redaction suggests that
the entire paragraph, including the footnote, deals with a criticism of the wiretaps
deemed too sensitive to be published. The footnote may have contained any court
cases that supported the petitioner’s argument. In the summary for the extended
redaction, the court notes, “no issue falling within this description has arisen,” and
“safeguards are in place.” This language suggests that in the redaction, the
petitioner argues that the surveillance could lead to a specific privacy violation, but
the court dismisses the argument.
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Readers may interpret the redaction of the petitioner’s arguments that
criticize the government as denying the petitioner status as an actor. The
government claims silence for examples that support its own arguments,
empowering itself. Then, the government silences the petitioner by redacting entire
sections that detailed potential errors of surveillance. Taken in tandem, the
implication of redacting criticisms is that their discussion is simply too dangerous
for the public to read.
Conclusion
In sum, the FISCR redacts the name of the service provider and customers
under surveillance, the chronology of the surveillance, procedures used during
surveillance, and criticisms of the surveillance. The court’s rationale for redacting
information assumes that any information the executive deems classified could be
used as counterintelligence by foreign agents. However, my analysis reveals that
numerous other motivations could be attributed to the court’s silence, including
covering up possible illegal surveillance, legitimizing the surveillance, and
minimizing the chance of lawsuits.
Regardless of this interpretation of the redaction’s content, alternative
conclusions can be reached. While the word clusters around the silence invite the
reader to make certain assumptions about the removed content’s meaning, the
redactions make certainty of interpretation impossible. Brummett’s second
characteristic of a strategic silence—public attribution of predictable meaning—is
driven in large part by ideology. The United States government has a long history of
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violating privacy in the name of national security,213 and the state secrets privilege
has provided the government with a justification for silencing judicial review.
This study has only explored attributions of meaning to the silence that could
potentially lead to abuses of privacy. However, the conclusions of the FISCR are
significant because they represent a constitutive rhetoric that implies the authority
of the government is of a higher importance than the autonomy of its people.
According to White, legal discourse should be concerned with the type of
community it constitutes. Based on this assertion, it is crucial to scrutinize the
ideology that justifies using silence to intrude on an individual’s privacy for national
security.
The two ideologies most prominent in the opinion, liberal individualism and
American exceptionalism, are forced into tension with each other in the FISCR
opinion in three ways: redacting names, redacting procedures, and redacting
criticisms. First, silencing the names in the document undercuts privacy’s
connection to liberal individualism by denying the individual’s identity. An
ideograph’s connection to ideology is what provides it with its persuasive power,
and without the backing of liberal individualism, privacy lacks persuasiveness.
Portraying the nameless group as part of a terrorist threat confers irrationality
associated with terrorism onto the customers. A facet of the American
exceptionalist myth is an adherence to individual reason and liberty. The
irrationality of terrorists stands in opposition to this value, putting the group of
nameless customers at odds with American exceptionalism. Thus, when a group
whose identity is unknown but is aligned with terrorists, it severs the link between
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privacy and the ideology that lends it persuasive power, concretizing an
understanding of national security and American exceptionalism as more necessary
to the community.
Second, the court’s language presents the procedures as if they are in place to
defend privacy. Liberal individualism, and by extension privacy, stand against what
Levin‐Waldman calls “oppressive demands and intrusions of authority.”214
However, by redacting the procedures the opinion silences the very things that are
supposed to support liberal individualism. Certifications, in turn, support national
security because they are what allow the government to justify its claims and redact
the procedures. Proper national security officials must sign all the certifications,
which draws on American exceptionalism’s sense of moral authority.215 Thus, the
government’s ability to silence through certifications reinforces their power
justified by moral authority.
Last, redactions of criticisms and possible errors represent the most obvious
exercise of ideological power through national security. Much like the studies
presented by Hegde and Olson in which an exercise of power silenced a minority
group, silencing criticisms—particularly an entire section—indicates the privileging
of the American exceptionalist ideology that undergirds the persuasive power of
national security. In this case, the “essence of agency,”216 which privacy is supposed
to protect, gives way to the wealth of associations connected to the exceptionalist
myth.
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CHAPTER 4.
CONCLUSIONS
This study has explored the relationship between the positive ideographs
<privacy> and <national security> in legal discourse, which can constitute
community. The positive ideographs are thrust into tension by the negative
ideograph <terrorism>, and the FISCR negotiates that tension when explaining the
court’s decision in its opinion. The FISCR developed a descriptive constitution that
implies certain declared actions to resolve the tension between the ideographs,
which, in turn, constitutes community by demarcating acceptable action and
providing a common vocabulary for its citizens.
In this case, the FISCR constituted a community in which strengthening
national security is the purpose of the government rather than using national
security as a means to protect liberties, such as civil rights. By situating national
security its primary purpose term, the FISCR privileges an American exceptionalist
ideology over privacy and liberal individualism. The FISCR justified its reading of
the Constitution through silence. The FISCR redacted the names of service
providers, the names of customers under surveillance, procedures, chronology, and
criticisms. The redactions rationalized privileging American exceptionalism and
reified the persuasive power of national security by using it both as an end and as an
explanation for silence.
To conclude my study, I offer some reflections on my cluster analysis of
positive and negative ideographs in the FISCR opinion on In Re Directives. I will
reiterate the conclusions of my analysis and their implications for the community
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the opinion constitutes, detail the significance of the study’s contributions to the
communication scholarship on ideographs and silence, identify the limitations of the
study, and provide fruitful avenues for future research.
Ideographs, Constitution, and Silence
In both its word choice and its silence, the FISCR demonstrated a way of
elevating one positive ideograph above another. One step of that process would be
to marginalize the value of the ideograph not preferred by the court. Through both
what the FISCR said and what it excluded, the court developed a descriptive
constitution that treated the Fourth Amendment and privacy as situationally
defined by the Executive Branch. Situationally defining privacy marginalizes the
term because it presents privacy not as fundamental right, but as a privilege that can
be enjoyed when it the government permits.
The FISCR excluded former definitions of privacy that had more expansive
interpretations of the term. The FISCR ignored meanings of <privacy>, such as the
Griswold court calling it “a noble purpose”217 and Warren and Brandeis defining it as
an “inviolate personality,”218 that would have challenged the court’s shift in the
meaning of the ideograph. Instead, the FISCR focused on developing a “foreign
intelligence exception” to the Fourth Amendment, which presented <privacy> as a
contextual variable. The foreign intelligence exception the FISCR writes into its
descriptive constitution limits the scope of privacy to that of a scenic obstacle to be
overcome. Rendered part of the context, <privacy> functions with other scenic
variables to serve as merely a backdrop for governmental action. Understood within
the broader context of the interplay of ideographs, the rhetor can marginalize an
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ideograph by shifting it from serving as a purpose term to an element of the scene in
Burke’s pentad.
Redaction also works to marginalize <privacy> by silencing the petitioner’s
criticisms of the government’s surveillance. Redacting the petitioner’s criticisms
silences any arguments against the FISCR shift of the meaning of privacy to a
contextual variable. The redactions deny readers a chance to assess what the
petitioner viewed as the most dangerous encroachments by the government’s
surveillance, meaning that they are denied access to arguments that might motivate
them to pressure the legislative or executive branch to enact needed reforms.
Additionally, the FISCR redacts examples that support the government’s claims,
leaving the audience only with assertions that “the record supports the
government.”219 By redacting the support for the government’s arguments, the
FISCR allows the government to silence the petitioner’s criticisms with silence. In
essence, the FISCR emphasizes the notion that the public does not need to question
the authority of government by redacting the petitioner’s criticisms and the
examples that support why the petitioner’s criticisms are not persuasive. Such
redactions—both of the criticisms and the evidence used in response—represent
the clearest exercise of ideological power. The FISCR did not explicitly note that it
would redact such items, suggesting that the Executive Branch may have been
concerned both about its image and revealing intelligence secrets. The court’s
decision to silence criticisms indicates that redaction more broadly used in
conjunction with <national security> can create a synchronic relationship that
contracts the meaning of other ideographs.
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Much like redacting the criticisms, redacting the procedures in place to
protect privacy reinforces the FISCR’s understanding of privacy as a contextual
variable with a marginalized meaning. According to the FISCR, the procedures and
certifications, which the executive branch controls, will prevent violations of
privacy. Based on these safeguards, the FISCR argues the government has the
authority to use “speed, stealth, and secrecy,” to strengthen national security,
justifying the use of warrantless surveillance.220 However, the court redacts the
several of the procedures and the certifications come from “appropriate national
security officials” within the Executive Branch.221 Redacting procedures in place to
protect privacy denies the public a chance to determine for themselves whether the
procedures actually do ensure that intrusions are not occurring or if more
information is needed. The redactions marginalize privacy by focusing on the
government’s authority and silencing the safeguards for privacy.
Not only does the FISCR contract the meaning of <privacy>, but the court also
expands the meaning of <national security>. The FISCR argues for an expansion in
executive authority, writing that the courts should not “frustrate” government
efforts to protect national security.222 The implication is that the Executive Branch
should have expanded powers of surveillance and fewer checks on its use of that
power. The FISCR constituted a community in which domestic warrantless
surveillance by the government is not only acceptable, but expected in order to
strengthen national security. And by arguing that the courts should not impinge on
the authority of the Executive Branch, the FISCR constitutes a community in which
current judicial checks on surveillance for national security are sufficient and any
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more expansive interpretations would be an unacceptable hindrance. This
construction of <national security> inoculates it from future attempts to reduce the
ideograph’s scope and power. Arguing for the exclusion of the courts from
complaints of national security surveillance removes any means of legal recourse
from citizens. For example, in a district court case about warrantless surveillance
dismissed because of the state secrets privilege, Judge Kennelly reinforces the
FISCR’s constitution of the community, writing:
Nothing in this opinion, however, prevents the plaintiffs from using of the
legislative process, not to mention their right to free speech, to seek further
inquiry by the executive and legislative branches into the allegations in their
complaint. In short, though the Terkel plaintiffs cannot seek relief in court for
the claims made in their complaint as it now stands, they are free to seek
redress from the political branches, which are equally responsible to ensure
that the law is followed.223
According to Kennelly, the proper venue for addressing complaints of privacy
violations when national security is concerned is the legislature or the executive.
This assertion supports the FISCR’s conception of privacy as a contextual variable.
It removes the redress of privacy complaints from the legal sphere and places it at
the discretion of the legislature and the executive, which is often the source of the
complaint.
Silence also bolsters the FISCR’s expansion in the meaning of <national
security> by redacting the names of the communications service provider in the
opinion. Removing the name of the service provider allows the company to escape
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repercussions from assisting in the surveillance of its customers. For example,
public knowledge of the name of the service provider could lead to lawsuits or spark
a terrorist attack. However, by redacting names in the opinion, the FISCR relieved
the communication service provider of responsibility for assisting the government
in surveillance. It also allows the government to call on the service provider for
assistance in the future, which means the anonymous company could still be
engaged in surveillance for the Executive Branch. Broadly, the implication for the
community is that silencing the service provider expands executive privilege to
business activities as long as appropriate national security officials direct the action.
Redacting the names of customers also helped expand the meaning of
national security by aligning the customers with a threat. The redaction of the
names of the customers under surveillance denies them an identity, and the FISCR
asserts that the government is targeting only those that could reasonably be
potential threats to national security. The court focuses on the government’s
certifications and procedures in place to ensure only people who were risks to
national security were wiretapped, which aligned the redacted customers with
“foreign agents” or “collaborators,” presenting them as a threat to national security.
Because the customers are denied an identity, they can never be certain that they
were ever wiretapped. The redaction constitutes a community in which the citizens
have no legal recourse for warrantless surveillance, and denies citizens an
opportunity to challenge government suspicion of illegal activity. The redaction
expands the meaning of <national security> to include preempting legal redress if
the government claims a customer is a threat.
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Similarly, the opinion redacts the dates of the surveillance, which reinforces
the authority of the government and, essentially, places members of the executive
branch above the law if a national security concern exists. Since the Protect America
Act was enacted for only six months and the dates are unavailable, the public and
even members of the legal community have no way to judge the legality of the
government’s surveillance. The surveillance could have taken place before or after
the PAA, and other service providers could have been involved outside that time
frame. By redacting the chronology, the FISCR has, in effect, silenced possible
evaluation and debate by the public. Without knowledge of when the surveillance
happened, the public cannot prove that any of the surveillance was illegal, denying it
necessary information to push for recourse. Judge Kennelly argues that using free
speech to pressure the executive or the legislature is the proper avenue for
addressing violations of privacy by national security by the Executive Branch. But
without knowledge of the dates of the surveillance, the public cannot pressure any
branch of the government effectively to address domestic warrantless surveillance,
constituting a community in which the government can shut down public debate for
national security.
In sum, the FISCR decision can be interpreted as constituting a community
that emphasizes moral authority and taking action to correct the perceived
immorality of a fallen world. The opinion constitutes liberal individualism’s
emphasis on personal freedom as situationally established by the government and
secondary to protecting national security. The tenets of American exceptionalism
influence the FISCR’s descriptive constitution and help rationalize warrantless
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wiretapping to strengthen national security, while dismissing the Fourth
Amendment’s role in shielding citizen’s from intrusions of authority.
Contributions to Ideographic Theory
My study adds to ideographic theory by examining the way a rhetor can shift
the meaning of an ideograph by repositioning it from its conventional placement in
Burke’s pentad. McGee’s definition of a positive ideograph focuses on society’s
ideals, which conceived in Burkean terms would arguably equate with the pentad’s
purpose. George W. Bush, for example, presented the purpose terms related to his
war on terrorism as freedom, democracy, and our way of life. Similarly, Martin
Luther King presented <equality> as the purpose of his address to the nation during
his March on Washington.
In the case of In re Directives, the court has two competing positive
ideographs that could serve as the purpose in the pentad. By choosing one over the
other, the court yields insight into its underlying ideology. The FISCR places
<national security> as its ultimate goal in the opinion, thus elevating it above the
rival positive ideograph. By positioning the competing ideograph, <privacy>, in the
scene, the court reduces it to one of several contextual variables. As such, the court
contracts the meaning of <privacy>, subordinating it to <national security>.
This study also contributes to rhetorical criticism by demonstrating how
analyzing the linguistic context of redactions can become a useful tool for future
rhetorical analyses. Language clusters immediately preceding and following
redactions can provide the critic clues to the content of what the court withheld
from public view. Such an approach suggests ways to understand the justifications
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used to persuade the audience to accept contractions and expansions of competing
ideographic meaning.
Limitations and Future Avenues of Research
This study has at least three easily identifiable limitations. The first
limitation is the time frame it analyzes. A central feature of my argument is that the
time period following 9/11 and the passage of the PATRIOT Act presents a unique
period in American history, particularly for the ideographs national security and
privacy. This time period offers a unique look at the synchronic relationship
between the ideographs, but it represents only a narrow slice of history in the
interaction of the ideographs. As McGee notes, ideographs are best studied
diachronically as well as synchronically.224 My study presents limited historic
information, but does not provide an exhaustive diachronic analysis of the terms. A
potential avenue for future research could fill this gap by looking at the expansions
and contractions of the terms throughout the history of the United States. A full
diachronic study, similar to Condit and Lucaites’ study on equality, could provide a
way to examine whether the ideographs have always been dissonant or if history
offers a meaning of the ideographs that could negotiate some kind of consonance.
Second, my study is limited to a concentration on legal discourse. I argued
that legal discourse plays a significant part in the constitution of community, and,
therefore, is an important place to analyze ideographs. However, many scholars see
the value of analyzing ideographs in the context of popular discourse, given the role
of ideology in the public sphere more generally. Legal discourse has a specific,
technical vocabulary that can muffle ideological commitments. Analyzing usage of
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the ideographs in popular discourse could offer additional insights into the
relationship between the two terms. Studies ranging from examining the terms in
presidential discourse to usage in movies or news could provide interesting results
for a more nuanced understanding of how privacy and national security interact
rhetorically.
Third, the conclusions related to ideology embedded in the redactions are
speculative. While no solution to this shortcoming is readily available, future
scholars should examine any historical parallels that might contain relevance to
question of how the court interprets the boundaries of <privacy> and <national
security> in threatening times. Careful readings of biographies and papers of
members of the executive branch may also yield insights into the context of the
court’s opinion.
Despite these limitations, this study has provided insight into how <national
security> and <privacy> in legal discourse constitutes community in the United
States. The study demonstrates that when one ideograph becomes more important
than another, it can reshape the Constitutional scene, allowing for expansions in
executive authority. When <national security> becomes the nation’s focus, the chief
executive’s power can override the checks and balances built into the Constitution
to protect individual liberties.
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